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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012)
Synopsis:
Karen Capato conceived twin children through in vitro
fertilization after her husband’s death. Ms. Capato applied for Social
Security surviving child’s insurance benefits for the twins. However,
the Social Security Administration (SSA) denied the application.
Ms. Capato brought this action for review of the SSA’s denial of her
application for surviving child’s insurance benefits under the Social
Security Act. The United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey affirmed the SSA’s decision, and Ms. Capato appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Third
Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision, in part, and vacated the
decision, in part. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Upon
review, the Supreme Court held that because the twin children could
not inherit from the decedent under Florida’s intestacy laws, they
were not entitled to Social Security survivors benefits. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court determined that the provisions of the Social
Security Act, which the SSA asserted governed the determination of
the status of posthumously conceived children, met the standards of
rational basis review. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the Third
Circuit’s decision, in part, and remanded the case.
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
Karen and Robert Capato married in 1999; however, Robert died
of cancer in 2002.1 At his death, Mr. Capato resided in Florida, and
his will, executed in Florida, provided for the son born of his
marriage to Karen and two children from a previous marriage. 2 The
will did not include any provisions for children conceived after his
death.3 Shortly after Mr. Capato’s death, Karen Capato began in

1

Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012).
Id.
3
Id.
2
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vitro fertilization using her husband’s frozen sperm, and eighteen
months after Robert Capato’s death, Karen Capato gave birth to
twins.4 Karen Capato then filed a claim for survivors’ insurance
benefits on behalf of the twins; however, the Social Security
Administration denied her application.5 The United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed the SSA’s decision.6
The District Court determined that the twins would qualify for
survivor’s insurance benefits only if they were entitled to inherit from
the deceased wage earner, their father Mr. Capato, under state
intestacy laws.7 As Robert Capato died domiciled in Florida, Florida
intestacy laws applied. Under Florida law, posthumously born
children may inherit through intestate succession only if the child is
conceived during the decedent’s lifetime.8 The district court
concluded that because the twins were conceived after Robert
Capato’s death, they could not inherit from their father under state
intestacy laws; and, therefore, they also did not qualify for survivor’s
insurance benefits.9 Karen Capato appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit reversed
the district court’s decision, holding that “‘the undisputed biological
children of a deceased wage earner and his widow’ qualify for
survivors benefits without regard to state intestacy law.’”10 In order
to resolve this conflict, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Section 402(d) of the Social Security Act states, “every child of a
deceased insured individual shall be entitled to child’s insurance
benefit[s].”11 However, the Supreme Court had to determine whether
the Capato twins qualified as children of the deceased insured under
the Social Security Act.12 In order to address this question, the
Supreme Court specifically looked to two sections of the Social

4

Id.
Id.
6
Id.
7
Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2026.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 2027.
11
Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2027; see also 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2012).
12
Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2026.
5
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Security Act, section 416(e) and section 416(h)(2)(a).13 Section
416(e) defines the term child as “the child or legally adopted child of
an individual.”14 However, section 416(h)(2)(a) states that, when
determining whether an applicant is the child of an insured
individual, the “Commissioner of Social Security shall apply the
intestacy law of the insured individual’s domiciliary State.”15 The
SSA argued that section 416(h)(2)(a) clarified the definition of child
offered in section 416(e), and thus section 416(h)(2)(a) governed the
meaning of the term child when dealing with applicants for insurance
benefits.16 On the other hand, Karen Capato, on behalf of her twin
children, argued that the Supreme Court should adopt the Third
Circuit’s interpretation of the Social Security Act, of which section
416(e) controlled the meaning of the term child.17 The Supreme
Court evaluated both the SSA’s and the Third Circuit’s arguments
and ultimately determined that the SSA’s interpretation of the Social
Security Act was more persuasive.18
In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court first evaluated the
Third Circuit’s decision that section 416(e)’s definition of child
governed which applicants were entitled to insurance benefits. 19 The
Third Circuit asserted that section 416(h)(2)(a) only governs when a
child’s family status needs to be determined; and, as there was no
family status to determine in this case, section 416(e)’s definition of
child must govern.20 The Supreme Court recognized that family
status was not at issue in this case as there was no question that the
twins were the biological children of Robert and Karen Capato.21
However, the Supreme Court looked to the language of the Social
Security Act and the intent of Congress to determine that section
416(h)(2)(a) was intended to compliment and further clarify section

13

Id. at 2027–28.
Id. at 2027; see also 42 U.S.C. § 416(e)(1) (2012).
15
Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2028; see also 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(a) (2012).
16
Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2028.
17
Id. at 2029.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2029.
14
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416(e)’s vague definition of child.22 Section 416(h)(2)(a) specifically
refers to “this subchapter,” and this reference includes both section
402(d) and section 416(e).23 Thus, the Supreme Court determined
that Congress intended section 416(h)(2)(a) to provide a “plain and
explicit instruction on how the determination of child status should
be made.”24 Furthermore, the Court also found that the Social
Security Act commonly refers to state law for matters of family
status as seen with the Act’s reference to state law to define such
terms as wife, widow, or parent of an insured individual.25
Therefore, the Court held that requiring all “child” applicants to
qualify as children of the insured decedent under state intestacy law
created a simple and clear test that ensured benefits for those plainly
contemplated by Congress and avoided congressional entanglement
in state-law family relations.26
The Court also determined that using section 416(h)(2)(a)’s
definition of “child” furthers the purpose of the Social Security Act.
Congress’s intent with the Act was to create a program that would
provide “dependent members of a wage earners family with
protection against the hardships occasioned by the loss of the
insured’s earnings.”27 If a child can take personal property from the
deceased’s estate under state intestacy laws, the Court determined
that it is reasonable to assume the child will more likely be dependent
during the parent’s life and at the parent’s death.28 Thus, the state
intestacy laws help to further the overall purpose of the Social
Security Act.29
Finally, the Supreme Court addressed Karen Capato’s
constitutional claim.
Mrs. Capato asserted that the SSA’s
interpretation of the Act raised equal protection and due process
concerns because their interpretation treated posthumously conceived
children as an “inferior subset of natural children who are ineligible

22

Id. at 2030–31.
Id. at 2031.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2031.
27
Id. at 2032.
28
Id.
29
Id.
23

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

444

33-1

for government benefits.”30 Just as the Third Circuit had previously
rejected this argument, the Supreme Court also rejected this claim.
The Court applied rational basis review, as this case did not involve
illegitimate children of unwed parents, but only posthumously
conceived children.31 Under rational basis review, the SSA’s
interpretation of the Social Security Act must be reasonably related to
the government’s interests.32 Here, the government’s interests are to
reserve benefits to those children who have lost a parent’s support
and to minimize the administrative burden of proving dependency on
a case-by-case basis.33 The Supreme Court concluded that the SSA’s
adoption of section 416(h)(2)(a) as the controlling definition of a
“child” is reasonably related to achieving these government
interests.34 As the SSA’s interpretation of the statute is at least
reasonable, it is entitled to deference under the Chevron standard
because Congress gave the SSA the authority to interpret and enforce
the Social Security Act, and the SSA’s interpretation in this case was
neither arbitrary nor capricious.35 Thus, the Court determined that
there were no equal protection or due process violations in the SSA’s
interpretation of the Social Security Act.
After considering all of these factors, the Supreme Court held that
applications for child insurance benefits, as in this case, must be
resolved in reference to state intestacy law.36 Furthermore, the
provisions of the Social Security Act determining the status of
posthumously conceived children passed rational basis review.37
Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit’s decision
and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.38

30

Id. at 2033.
Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2033.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 2033–34.
36
Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2034.
37
Id.
38
Id.
31
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Impact:
With this case, the Supreme Court once again showed deference
to government agency interpretation of a statute. This deference
reinforces the concept that courts want to avoid getting involved in
governmental agency decisions when possible. Furthermore, with
this decision, the Supreme Court established a standard interpretation
of the term child for the Social Security Act. This allows the SSA
and the courts to avoid having to make burdensome case-by-case
determinations.
Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012)
Synopsis:
Southern Union Co. was convicted by a jury in federal court for
violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA). The jury found that Southern Union Co. had knowingly
stored liquid mercury without a permit at a subsidiary facility. For
violating the RCRA, the probation office set a maximum fine of
$38.1 million and imposed an actual fine of $6 million. Southern
Union Co. argued, on appeal, that by setting this maximum fine and
imposing the actual fine, the district court engaged in judicial factfinding that enlarged the maximum punishment authorized for a
particular crime, thus violating their Sixth Amendment rights. The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the
district court’s sentencing, holding that Apprendi does not apply to
criminal fines. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and determined
that Apprendi does apply to the imposition of criminal fines. Thus,
the Supreme Court held that, in setting the maximum potential fine
and imposing an actual fine on Southern Union Co., the district court
did engage in judicial fact-finding that enlarged the maximum
punishment the defendant faced beyond what the jury’s verdict or the
defendant’s admissions allowed.
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Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
Southern Union Co. is a natural gas distributor whose subsidiary
stored liquid mercury at a facility in Rhode Island.39 In September
2007, a grand jury indicted Southern Union Co. on multiple counts
for violating federal environmental statutes; however, only the first
count is relevant here. The first count alleged that the company
violated the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 by
knowingly storing liquid mercury without a permit at the Rhode
Island facility “from September 19, 2002 until on or about October
19, 2004.”40 After a trial in the District Court of Rhode Island, a jury
convicted Southern Union Co. of unlawfully storing liquid mercury
“on or about September 19, 2002 to October 19, 2004.”41
RCRA violations are punishable by a fine of no more than
$50,000 for each day of the violation.42 The probation office set a
maximum fine of $38.1 million by determining that Southern Union
Co. violated the RCRA for 762 days, from September 19, 2002
through October 19, 2004.43 Southern Union Co. argued that this
calculation violated Apprendi44 as the jury was not required to
determine the precise duration of the company’s violation.45 The
company pointed to the fact that the jury verdict form only listed an
approximate start date for the violation and permitted a conviction if
the jury found a violation for even one day. 46 Thus, imposing a fine
greater than the single day penalty of $50,000 required the district
court to engage in judicial fact-finding, violating the Apprendi
precedent.47 In response, the Government acknowledged that the

39

Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2349 (2012).
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). This case reserves to
juries the determination of any fact, other than that of a prior conviction, which
might increase a criminal defendant’s maximum potential sentence. The case has
been applied to multiple cases involving imprisonment or death, but has yet to be
applied to cases involving criminal fines. Southern Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2349.
45
Southern Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2349.
46
Id.
47
Id.
40
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jury was not required to specify the duration of the violation, but
argued that Apprendi does not apply to criminal fines.
The district court held that Apprendi did apply to criminal fines,
but upheld the sentencing because the court concluded that based on
the content and context of the verdict the jury had found a 762-day
violation.48 Therefore, the district court enforced a $6 million fine
and $12 million community service obligation on Southern Union
Co.49 The company appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit. The First Circuit rejected the district court’s
finding that the jury necessarily found a 762-day violation, but
upheld the sentence by concluding that Apprendi did not apply to
criminal fines.50 As the circuit courts have reached contradictory
conclusions on the application of Apprendi, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in order to resolve the conflict.51
In order to resolve this conflict, the Supreme Court had to
consider the scope of the Sixth Amendment right of jury trial.
Apprendi states that besides prior convictions, “any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.”52 According to Apprendi, the statutory maximum
is the maximum sentence a judge can impose based solely on the
facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.53 The
Supreme Court determined that the purpose of Apprendi is to ensure
that the jury is the one who determines the facts that warrant
punishment for a statutory offense.54 This concern applies whether
the sentence is a criminal fine, imprisonment, or death.55 The
Government argued that because criminal fines are less serious
punishments than incarceration or death, Apprendi should not
apply.56 However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument. The

48

Id.
Id.
50
Southern Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2349.
51
Id.
52
See Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. 2348.
53
Id.
54
Southern Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2350.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 2351.
49
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Court pointed to the fact that one reason Southern Union Co. was
properly accorded a jury trial was due to the seriousness of the
potential punishment, the fines.57 Furthermore, the Government
admitted that the district court made factual findings, which increased
the potential and actual fine the court imposed.58 This judicial factfinding that increases the maximum punishment a defendant faces
beyond a jury’s verdict or the defendant’s admission is precisely
what Apprendi is intended to guard against.59
The Supreme Court also determined that Apprendi does not allow
courts to distinguish between a fact that is an element of the crime
and a fact that goes to determining the maximum sentence of a
crime.60 These are both facts that must be determined by the jury,
and are not subject to judicial fact-finding. In this case, the fact that
will ultimately determine the maximum fine that Southern Union Co.
faces is the number of days the company was in violation of the
RCRA.61 The Court decided that the Government must prove to the
jury that Southern Union Co. committed the acts constituting the
violation for each day of the alleged 762 day long violation. By
requiring that the jury must determine the duration of the violation,
the Supreme Court ruled that Apprendi applies to the imposition of
criminal fines. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings.
Impact:
In determining that Apprendi applies to the imposition of
criminal fines, the Supreme Court established a unified rule for
courts to follow when evaluating whether a court has engaged in
judicial fact-finding during the sentencing portion of a trial. This
ruling resolves any conflict that may have existed between the circuit
courts on this matter. Furthermore, this decision does not mark an
unexpected extension of the Apprendi doctrine as most circuit courts
have already addressed this issue and applied the doctrine to criminal

57

Id.
Id. at 2352.
59
Southern Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2352.
60
Id. at 2356.
61
Id.
58
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fines. Therefore, this decision does not mark a drastic departure from
precedent as the Government alleged, but formally recognizes an
already widely established application of the Apprendi doctrine to
criminal fines.
Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1350 (2012)
Synopsis:
Dana Roberts petitioned for review of an order of the Office of
Workers’ Compensation Program setting his maximum weekly rate
for his Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act
(LHWCA) benefits at the statutory maximum rate for 2002. Roberts
argued that his benefits should have been based on the higher
statutory maximum rate for 2007, as 2007 was the year in which he
was “newly awarded compensation” by an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ). The ALJ denied reconsideration, and the Department of
Labor’s Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision
determining that the relevant maximum rate is determined by the date
the disability begins. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision holding that an employee is
newly awarded compensation under the LHWCA when the employee
first becomes entitled to compensation. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve any conflict regarding when a workers’
compensation beneficiary is newly awarded compensation. The
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court decision and held that a
claimant is newly awarded compensation under the LHWCA when
the employee first becomes entitled to compensation.
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act provides
compensation for the disability or death of employees who suffer an
injury or death while working upon navigable waters of the United
States.62 The employee’s compensation depends on the severity of
his injury and his pre-injury pay.63 However, section 906 of the

62
63

Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1350, 1354 (2012).
Id.
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LHWCA caps benefits for most types of disability at “twice the
national average weekly wage for the fiscal year in which an injured
employee is newly awarded compensation.”64 In this case, the
controversy arises over when an employee is “newly awarded
compensation.”
In fiscal year 2002, Dana Roberts slipped and fell on a patch of
ice while employed by Sea-Land Services marine terminal in Dutch
Harbor, Alaska.65 Roberts notified Sea-Land of his injury, and SeaLand voluntarily paid Roberts workers’ compensation benefits
without a compensation order until fiscal year 2005.66 After SeaLand discontinued paying Roberts the benefits, Roberts filed a
LHWCA claim and Sea-Land controverted.67 After a hearing, in
fiscal year 2007, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) awarded
Roberts benefits based on twice the national average weekly wage for
fiscal year 2002, as this was the year Roberts became disabled.68
Roberts moved for reconsideration, arguing that he was entitled to
benefits based on the national average weekly wage for the fiscal
year 2007, as this was the year that he was “newly awarded
compensation” by the ALJ’s order.69
The ALJ denied
reconsideration, and the Department of Labor’s Benefits Review
Board affirmed the decision.70 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision holding that an employee
is “newly awarded compensation” under section 906(c) of the
LHWCA when the employee first becomes entitled to compensation,
thus when the injury occurs.71 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to determine when an employee was “newly awarded compensation.”
Roberts argued that the phrase “awarded compensation” in
section 906(c) of the LHWCA refers to a formal order, while SeaLand argued that the phrase refers to when an employee is statutorily
entitled to compensation due to a disability and that a formal order is

64

Id. See also 33 U.S.C. § 906(c) (2012).
Roberts, 132 S. Ct. at 1355.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Roberts, 132 S. Ct. at 1355.
71
Id.
65
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not required.72 The Supreme Court determined that the language of
section 906(c) of the LHWCA itself could be interpreted either way.
However, after looking to the overall statutory scheme of the
LHWCA, the Court determined that only the interpretation offered by
Sea-Land was appropriate.73
By interpreting “awarded
compensation” to mean “statutorily entitled to compensation because
of disability,” the Court ensured the administrative rule would
provide for the equal treatment of similarly situated beneficiaries and
prevent gamesmanship in the workers’ compensation claims
process.74
Furthermore, the Court noted that if Roberts’ interpretation of the
language was adopted and a formal order was required for an award,
section 906(c) would become inapplicable to the majority of
disability claims.75 Most employers voluntarily make payments to
disabled employees upon notification of the disability without
engaging in any administrative proceeding.76 Thus by interpreting
“awarded compensation” to refer to the point at which an employee
first becomes statutorily entitled to compensation, when the disability
occurs, the Court ensured that employers who voluntarily paid
benefits could calculate the compensation cap.77 To calculate this
cap, the employers would simply look to the average weekly wage
for the fiscal year in which the disability occurred.78 This means of
calculation prevents employers and employees from having to resort
to unnecessary administrative proceedings in order to receive
compensation. Moreover, the traditional administrative practice is to
treat the time of the injury as the relevant date for awarding
compensation.79 By adopting Sea-Land’s interpretation of “award
compensation,” the Court upholds this administrative tradition.
Finally, the Court noted that by establishing that an employee is
“newly awarded compensation” when the employee first becomes

72

Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1356–57.
74
Id.
75
Roberts, 132 S. Ct. at 1357.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 1358–59.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 1359.
73
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disabled, and thus statutorily entitled to benefits, helps prevent
employees from engaging in gamesmanship in the claims process.80
If compensation awards were valued based on the time an ALJ
ordered the award, then employees would likely wait until a later
fiscal year to file the award.81 By waiting until a later fiscal year, the
employees would likely receive higher compensation as the
compensation cap is based on the average weekly wage for the given
fiscal year, and this average weekly wage typically increases each
fiscal year. This would allow employees with similar injuries and
pre-injury pay rates to receive different levels of compensation
simply because of the time they filed their claims and received ALJ
compensation orders. The Court notes that this practice would go
against Congress’s intent in creating the LHWCA.82 Thus, after all
of these considerations, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate
court’s decision and determined that an employee is “newly awarded
compensation” when the employee first becomes disabled and thus
statutorily entitled to benefits under the LHWCA.83 The year in
which a compensation order is issued does not affect the calculation
cap of the award the employee is entitled to.84
Impact:
With this decision, the Supreme Court prevented similarly
situated disabled employees from receiving disparate treatment when
determining what statutory maximum rate of compensation the
employees were entitled to. This decision also discourages disabled
employees from engaging in gamesmanship when filing disability
claims. Furthermore, this case prevents unnecessary administrative
proceedings, as it does not allow employees to file disability claims
years later in an attempt to increase their award. The decision
protects employers, who voluntarily pay disability claims when the
disability initially occurs, from being subject to higher rates from a
compensation order filed years later.

80

Roberts, 132 S. Ct. at 1359, 1363.
Id. at 1359–60.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 1363.
84
Id.
81
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Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012)
Synopsis:
The Sacketts received a compliance order from the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) alleging that their parcel of
land was subject to the Clean Water Act (CWA). The compliance
order further alleged that by filling about a half acre of their property
with dirt and rock the Sacketts had violated the CWA. The order
required that the Sacketts restore the property in accordance with the
EPA’s Restoration Work Plan and provide the EPA with access to all
of their records and documents regarding the parcel. The Sacketts
brought a civil action against the EPA seeking an injunction and
declaratory relief. The United States District Court for the District of
Idaho dismissed the matter, and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court determined
that the EPA’s compliance order was a final agency action for which
there was no other adequate remedy other than Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) review. Furthermore, the Court determined
that the CWA did not prevent this APA review.
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
The Clean Water Act prohibits the “discharge of any pollutant by
any person, without a permit into the ‘navigable waters’ of the United
States.”85 If the Environmental Protection Agency determines that
any person is in violation of the CWA, the EPA can issue a
compliance order or initiate civil enforcement action.86 If the EPA
prevails in a civil action, the CWA allows the EPA to impose a civil
penalty of $37,500 per day of the violation.87 However, if an
individual has been issued a compliance order but fails to comply,
and the EPA prevails in a civil action, the civil penalty may be
increased to $75,000 per day of the violation.88
85

Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1369–70 (2012); see also 33 U.S.C. §§
1311, 1344 (2012).
86
Id. at 1370.
87
Id.
88
Id.
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The Sacketts owned a residential parcel of land in Idaho. 89 The
parcel lied just north of Priest Lake, but was separated from the lake
by several lots containing permanent structures.90 In preparation for
building a house on the parcel, the Sacketts filled in part of their
parcel with rock and dirt.91 A few months after this filling, the
Sacketts received a compliance order from the EPA alleging that the
Sacketts had violated the CWA. The order asserted that (1) the
Sacketts’ parcel contained wetlands; (2) these wetlands are adjacent
to Priest Lake, and Priest Lake is a navigable water of the United
States under the CWA, (3) the Sacketts discharged fill material into
the wetlands site, filling approximately one half acre; and (4) filling
this area constituted a violation of the CWA, as the Sacketts
discharged pollutants into waters of the United States without a
permit.92 The EPA’s compliance order required that the Sacketts
immediately take steps to restore the site in accordance with an EPA
created Restoration Work Plan, and required the Sacketts to turn over
all records and documents concerning the site to the EPA.93
The Sacketts did not believe their parcel was subject to the CWA,
and thus asked the EPA for a hearing.94 Their request for a hearing
was denied, and the Sacketts brought this action in the District Court
for the District of Idaho seeking an injunction and declaratory
relief.95 The District Court dismissed their claim for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction, and the Unites States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed concluding that the CWA “precludes
preenforcement judicial review of compliance orders, and that such
preclusion does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s due process
guarantee.”96 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but declined to
consider the scope of what constitutes “navigable waters” subject to
the CWA.97 Instead, the Court limited its review to whether the

89

Id.
Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 1370–71.
93
Id. at 1371.
94
Id.
95
Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371.
96
Id. at 1371.
97
Id. at 1370.
90
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compliance order was a final agency decision thus subjecting the
order to judicial review under Chapter 7 of the Administrative
Procedure Act.98
There was no dispute that the compliance order was an agency
action; however, the question remained whether the action was
final.99 The Court first concluded that the order determined the
Sacketts’ rights and obligations. Under the order, the Sacketts had a
legal obligation to restore their property according to the EPA
generated and approved Restoration Work Plan, and had the legal
obligation to turn over all records and documents related to the fill
site.100 In addition to these legal obligations, the compliance order
also subjected the Sacketts to legal consequences. The order allows
the Government to potentially impose a penalty of up to $75,000 per
day of the violation if the Government pursues future enforcement
proceedings.101 Furthermore, the order severely limits the Sacketts’
ability to get a permit for their actions from the Army Corps of
Engineers, as the Army Corps of Engineers will not process a permit
application until any EPA compliance issues are resolved.102
The Court then looked to the issuance of the order in relation to
the EPA’s decision-making process. The Court determined that the
issuance of a compliance order marked the end of the EPA’s
decision-making process.103 As exemplified by the denial of the
Sacketts’ request for a hearing, the findings and conclusions of a
compliance order are not subject to further agency review.104 The
fact that the Sacketts could engage in informal discussion with the
EPA regarding the terms of the order was not sufficient to “make an
otherwise final agency action nonfinal.”105 Moreover, the APA
requires that the person seeking “APA review of the final agency
action have ‘no other adequate remedy in court.’”106 Typically in
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CWA enforcement cases judicial review occurs as a result of a civil
action brought by the EPA.107 However, the Sacketts, in this case,
would have to wait for the EPA to initiate a civil action before having
an opportunity for judicial review.108 Thus, each day that the EPA
does not file a civil action, the Sacketts become potentially liable for
additional fines associated with violating the compliance order.
The Supreme Court then reviewed the Government’s argument
that, under section 701(a)(1) of the APA, the CWA qualified as a
statute that specifically precluded judicial review and thus excludes
APA review of the compliance order.109 The Court rejected this
argument concluding that the APA intends to provide judicial review
for all final agency actions, especially when these agency actions are
not subject to further review mechanisms.110 The Court further
acknowledged that by allowing judicial review of final agency
actions, such as compliance orders, the EPA might be less inclined to
use compliance orders, as the orders would no longer encourage
voluntary compliance.111 However, the Court determined that
efficiency was not sufficient to overcome the APA’s presumptions of
allowing judicial review for final agency action.112 After all of these
considerations, the Supreme Court determined that the EPA’s
compliance order, issued to the Sacketts, constituted a final agency
action for which APA review is the only adequate remedy available,
and that the CWA does not preclude this review.113
Impact:
This decision provides recipients of final agency actions,
specifically EPA issued compliance orders, with a means of
obtaining judicial review.
This is particularly important for
recipients such as the Sacketts who would have continued to accrue
potential liability fines until the agency, the EPA, initiated a civil
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action. Thus, this decision provides compliance order recipients with
an alternative option, judicial review, instead of forcing them to
choose to voluntarily comply or simply wait for the EPA to take civil
action. Furthermore, with this decision, the Supreme Court firmly
established that the APA places greater importance on the fairness of
the process than efficiency in the process.
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEAL
Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 687 F.3d. 403
(D.C. Cir. 2012)
Synopsis:
Spirit Airlines, in conjunction with other airlines, petitioned for
review of the Department of Transportation (DOT) final rule
Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections. The DOT issued this rule
pursuant to its authority to regulate unfair and deceptive practices in
the airline industry. The airlines challenged three provisions of the
Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections rule—the Airline
Advertising Rule, the Refund Rule, and the Post Purchase Price Rule.
The airlines alleged that the provisions violated their right to free
speech, and that the provisions were arbitrary and capricious under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia found that all three provisions
were reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious under the APA. The
D.C. Circuit also found that the Airfare Advertising Rule did not
deprive the airlines of First Amendment protection of commercial
speech, that the Refund Rule did not violate the Airline Deregulation
Act, and that the Post Purchase Price Rule was procedurally lawful.
Thus, the D.C. Circuit denied the airlines petition for review of the
DOT’s final rule Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections.
Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
Despite Congress passing the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978,
the Department of Transportation retained the authority to regulate
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and prohibit unfair and deceptive practices in the airline industry.114
The DOT exercised this authority by issuing a final rule entitled
Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections.115 Spirit Airlines, and
other airlines, challenged three of the provisions under this final
rule—the Airline Advertising Rule, the Refund Rule, and the Post
Purchase Price Rule.116 The Airline Advertising Rule required that
total, final prices for airline fares be the most prominent price figure
displayed.117 The Refund Rule required that airlines must allow
passengers to cancel reservations without penalty for twenty-four
hours if the reservation was made one week or more before the
flight’s departure.118 Finally, the Post Purchase Price Rule prohibited
airlines from increasing the price of seats, passenger baggage, or fuel
surcharge after the air transportation had been purchased, except in
the case of an increase in a government-imposed tax or fee.119 Spirit
Airlines, and other airlines, challenged all three of these provisions as
arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, and
then specifically alleged that the Airlines Advertising Rule violated
airlines’ First Amendment right to engage in commercial and
political speech.120 The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia took the airlines’ petition for review under
review to examine these challenges.
The D.C. Circuit began by looking at the challenge to the Airfare
Advertising Rule. The airlines asserted that there is nothing
deceptive about listing the taxes of airline fares separately from the
total price, and that the DOT lacked sufficient evidence to conclude
this was a deceptive practice.121 The airlines alleged that as the DOT
lacked sufficient evidence, this rule was arbitrary and capricious,
especially considering that in 2006 the DOT had reaffirmed its policy
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of allowing base-fare advertising.122 The D.C. Circuit, however, was
not persuaded by the airlines’ argument. In 1984, the DOT passed a
rule requiring airlines’ advertised prices for air transportation to state
the total price the consumer would have to pay, including taxes.123
The disputed Airline Advertising Rule did not substantially alter this
1984 DOT rule, but only added language requiring that the total price
be the most prominently advertised price.124 The D.C. Circuit noted
that the airlines never challenged the original 1984 rule, and thus the
circuit court only had to consider whether the DOT acted arbitrarily
and capriciously when the DOT enforced the 1984 rule by passing
the Airline Advertising Rule.125
Government agencies are afforded substantial deference when
interpreting their own regulations.126 Therefore, unless the DOT’s
interpretation of the regulation was plainly erroneous or inconsistent,
the Airline Advertising Rule would be considered a reasonable
interpretation of the DOT’s authority to prohibit unfair or deceptive
practices. The DOT relied on comments from the original 1984
rulemaking, about 500 comments from a 2006 hearing explaining
how consumers were confused by advertised itemized pricing rather
than one total price, and feedback from a DOT online forum known
as the Regulation Room.127 Through this evidence, the DOT
concluded that consumers were being deceived by airlines
advertising lower price quotes that did not reflect the total cost of
travel.128 Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit determined that nothing in
the Airline Advertising Rule prevents airlines from advertising the
breakdown of the cost of the air transportation, including taxes and
government fees.129 The D.C. Circuit concluded that as the Airline
Advertising Rule only requires that the total price be the prominently
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displayed price, the rule was not an arbitrary or capricious exercise of
the DOT’s authority to prevent unfair and deceptive practices.130
Next, the D.C. Circuit addressed the airlines’ allegation that the
Airline Advertising Rule violated their First Amendment rights. The
airlines argued that strict scrutiny should be applied, as the
advertising of the airline prices, especially the associated government
taxes and fees, was political speech.131 The D.C. Circuit determined
that the advertising of airfares was not political speech, but
commercial speech, as the speech referred to a specific product,
airfare, and the airlines had economic motivations for the speech.132
After determining the speech was commercial in nature, the D.C.
Circuit analyzed the regulation of the speech using the Zauderer and
Central Hudson frameworks.133 Under Zauderer, an “advertiser’s
rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are
reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of
consumers.”134 The Airline Advertising Rule does not prohibit
airlines’ speech, but limits the manner in which airlines can advertise
airfares by requiring the airlines to disclose and make prominent the
total, final price.135 Applying Zauderer, the D.C. Circuit determined
that this disclosure requirement is not only reasonably related to the
government’s interest in preventing deception of consumers, but also
a reasonable means of achieving this interest.136 Furthermore, the
rule also satisfied the Central Hudson test. The Central Hudson test
requires that (1) the asserted government interest is substantial, (2)
the regulation directly advances the asserted government interest, and
(3) the means of achieving this interest are reasonable.137 The D.C.
Circuit determined that the substantial government interest in this
case was to ensure accuracy of commercial information in the
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marketplace.138 Then applying the second and third factors, the D.C.
Circuit determined that requiring the total, final price of airfare to be
the most prominently displayed price not only directly advanced the
government interest, but was a reasonable means of accomplishing
the interest.139 Therefore, as the Airline Advertising Rule met both
the Zauderer and Central Hudson frameworks, the rule did not violate
the airlines’ First Amendment rights.
The D.C. Circuit then addressed the airlines challenge to the
Refund Rule. This rule requires that airlines must allow consumers
to cancel reservations without penalty for twenty-four hours if the
consumers made reservations more than a week before the flight
departure.140 The airlines argue that this rule violates the Airline
Deregulation Act as it regulates airfares, and that it prevents the
airlines from ensuring their planes are full.141 The D.C. Circuit
rejected the airlines’ arguments determining that the Refund Rule
does not regulate airfares, but regulates airline cancelation policies
because existing cancellation policies were deceptive and unfair to
consumers.142 The DOT examined existing airline customer service
policies and determined that airlines’ cancelation policies in
particular were routinely misleading and vague.143 The DOT
determined that the vagueness and misleading nature of the policies
was unfair and deceptive to customers, thus the DOT established the
Refund Rule in order to establish industry norms for seats purchased
more than a week in advance.144 The D.C. Circuit held that this rule
was not an arbitrary or capricious as the Rule was a reasonable means
to prevent unfair and deceptive practices.145
Finally, the D.C. Circuit examined the Price Rule. The Price
Rule prevented airlines from increasing the price of seats, passenger
baggage, or fuel surcharge after the air transportation had been
purchased, except in the case of an increase in a government-imposed
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tax or fee.146 The airlines argue that this rule is procedurally
unlawful, as the airlines had no notice that the DOT was intending to
prohibit price increases for optional services after a passenger buys a
ticket but before a passenger purchases the optional services.147
Thus, the airlines argue that the DOT failed to give the airlines
proper notice of the scope and general thrust of the proposed rule.148
The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument and sided with the DOT’s
view that increases in the price of air transportation, including
increases in the price of seats, baggage, or applicable fuel surcharges,
after the consumer purchased the airfare, constituted an unfair and
deceptive policy. Thus, this rule established reasonable, not arbitrary
or capricious, industry guidelines to prevent these unfair and
deceptive policies.149
Having determined that all three of the challenged provisions of
the DOT’s final rule entitled Enhancing Airline Passenger
Protections were reasonable, procedurally lawful, and did not violate
the airlines’ First Amendment rights, the D.C. Circuit denied the
airlines petition for review of the DOT’s final rule.150
Impact:
With this case, the D.C. Circuit reestablishes that the DOT has
the authority to prohibit unfair and deceptive practices in the airline
industry. This case shows that this authority is broad in scope, and
emphasizes that the DOT does not have to come up with the best or
least restrictive policies, but only reasonable polices to prevent
unfairness and deception. As the case is limited to only three
provisions of the DOT’s final rule entitled Enhancing Airline
Passenger Protections, it is likely that the circuit courts, and possibly
the Supreme Court, will be confronted with additional challenges to
the DOT’s authority in the future.
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Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d. 511 (5th Cir. 2012)
Synopsis:
The Orellana-Monson brothers, Jose and Andres, are El
Savadoran citizens who entered the United States on October 22,
2005. The brothers were charged with entering the United States
without having been admitted or paroled. The Orellana-Monson
brothers applied for asylum and withholding of removal under the
Convention Against Torture (CAT). The brothers claimed that they
qualified for asylum and withholding of removal as members in a
particular social group, which feared future persecution. However,
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) rejected their application.
The brothers appealed the BIA’s decision to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s
ruling finding that the brothers were ineligible for asylum or for
withholding of removal, as they failed to qualify for membership in a
particular social group for which they feared future persecution.
Facts, Analysis, and Ruling:
Jose and Andres Orellana-Monson were born in El Salvador.151
A gang known as Mara 18 operates openly in El Salvador, and
actively recruits young El Salvadoran males.152 While he was living
in El Salvador, a local Mara 18 leader attempted to recruit, 11-yearold Jose to the gang.153 Jose claims that when he refused to join the
gang, the Mara 18 leader threatened to kill him and his family.154
After this incident, Jose and his 8-year-old brother Andres fled to the
United States.155 The brothers were charged with entering the United
States without having been admitted or paroled.156 The OrellanaMonson brothers claimed they were refugees eligible for asylum and
for withholding of removal because they were being persecuted due
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to their membership in a particular social group.157 Jose asserted that
he was a member of a social group consisting of “Salvadoran males,
ages 8 to 15, who have been recruited by Mara 18 but have refused to
join due to a principled opposition to gangs.”158 Andres similarly
asserted that he was a member of a social group consisting of
“siblings of members of Jose’s social group, or alternatively, family
members of Jose and that Mara 18 likely would impute Jose’s antigang political opinion to him.”159 The brothers claimed that
membership in these two social groups entitled them to asylum and
withholding of removal.
First, an Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Jose and Andres
were ineligible for asylum because the Salvadoran government was
trying to control Mara 18, the brothers had not been persecuted, and
the brothers did not qualify as members of a particular social group
or assert any political opinions.160 The Orellana-Monson brother
appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals; however, the BIA
determined that there was no evidence that the brothers had been
persecuted.161 In this initial decision, the BIA did not consider
whether the brothers belonged to a relevant social group for asylum
purposes.162 The brothers then appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit initially denied the
petition for review, but after an additional petition for a panel
rehearing, the Fifth Circuit heard oral arguments from the brothers.
The Fifth Circuit then remanded the case back to the BIA requiring
the BIA to evaluate the brother’s claim regarding being members of a
protected social group entitled to asylum.163 On remand, the BIA
determined that young Salvadoran males who rejected gang
membership and their families did not “possess the social visibility
and particularity to constitute membership in a particular social
group” and that these alleged groups were overly broad. 164 As the
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brothers did not qualify for membership in a particular social group,
the BIA found that the Orellana-Monson brothers failed to satisfy
their burden of showing past persecution on an enumerated ground,
and therefore were not entitled to a presumption of fear of future
persecution.165 For all of these reasons, the BIA determined that the
brothers did not qualify for asylum, and as withholding of removal
has a higher standard of proof than asylum, the brothers also did not
qualify for this standard of relief under the Convention Against
Torture.166 The BIA dismissed the Orellana-Monson brother’s
appeal, and the brother filed a second petition for review to the Fifth
Circuit.167
The Fifth Circuit only reviewed the second BIA decision.
Applying the Chevron standard, which gives deference to agency
interpretations of the statutes they enforce, the Fifth Circuit first
looked at whether the BIA’s interpretation of the CAT was
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”168 The
Attorney General has the discretion to grant asylum to refugees, and
a refugee is a defined as a person
who is outside of his country and is unable or
unwilling to return because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution, and who has
demonstrated . . . membership in a particular social
group or political opinion was or will be at least one
central reason for the persecution.169
A refugee must provide specific facts showing that he will be singled
out for persecution, and persecution is defined as “the infliction of
suffering or harm under government sanction, upon persons who
differ in a way regarded as offensive.”170 Furthermore, in order to
establish persecution based on membership in a particular group, as
the Orellana-Monson brothers allege, they must show that they are
165
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members of a group of persons who have common immutable
characteristics that either cannot be changed or that they should not
be required to change as the characteristic is fundamental to their
individual identities.171 Thus, for asylum based on being a member
of a particular social group, the Orellana-Monson brothers have to
show that they are not only members of a particular social group, but
that this membership is the cause of their persecution. These
definitions and requirements for asylum are very specific and
establish a high burden; however, the requirements to qualify for
withholding removal are even higher.172 As the standards for
withholding removal are more difficult to establish, if the OrellanaMonson brothers fail to meet the requirements for asylum, they will
also fail to qualify for withholding removal.
With these definitions and requirements in mind, the Fifth Circuit
reviewed the BIA’s ruling. The key question for the Fifth Circuit is
whether the BIA’s interpretation of the term “particular social
group,” as defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), is
entitled to Chevron deference.173 The BIA determined that to qualify
for asylum as a member of a particular social group, the social group
must be both socially visible and particular.174 According to the BIA,
social visibility refers to the extent to which members of society
perceive individuals with common characteristics as member of the
perceived social group.175 Moreover, particularity requires that the
social group can be accurately described in a manner that
differentiates the group and its members as a “discrete class of
persons.”176 The BIA had previously rejected the argument that
persons who resisted gang membership constituted a particular social
group.177 The BIA determined that these individuals who resisted
gang membership were neither socially visible enough nor particular
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enough to constitute a particular social group under the asylum
requirements.178
The Fifth Circuit had to review the BIA’s interpretation of social
visibility and particularity as a matter of first impression in the
circuit.179 After looking at unpublished cases and other circuit court
decisions, the Fifth Circuit determined that the BIA’s interpretation
of these two terms was entitled to Chevron deference. Chevron
required the Fifth Circuit to first look at whether the INA defined
“particular social group,” and if the INA did not define this term, was
the BIA’s interpretation permissible considering the construction of
the statute.180 The first question was easily answered; the INA does
not define the term “particular social group,” thus the Fifth Circuit
turned to determine whether the BIA’s interpretation of the term was
permissible.181
The Fifth Circuit determined that the BIA is entitled to use caseby-case analysis to provide meaning to statutorily ambiguous terms
such as the term “particular social group.”182 In this case, the BIA
determined that the particular social groups the Orellana-Monson
brothers alleged they were members of lacked both particularity and
social visibility. Jose argued that he was a member of a social group
constituting Salvadoran males between ages 8 and 15 who had been
recruited, but refused to join Mara 18.183 The BIA determined this
group was overly broad as Mara 18 recruits from a wide cross section
of society, and the only common trait individuals of this social group
would share is their refusal to join the gang.184 This characteristic is
not sufficiently particular to be singled out or even identified in El
Salvadoran society.185 Furthermore, this social group also fails the
social visibility requirement as there is no evidence to suggest that
the social group Jose suggests would even be perceived as a group in
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El Salvadoran society.186 It is more likely that these individuals who
refused to join Mara 18 would be perceived in the same manner as
any other member of society who was opposed to the gangs interests
or who represents a threat to the gang.187
Similarly, Andres argued that he was a member of a social groups
consisting of young Salvadoran males who are siblings or family
members of Jose’s social group.188 However, Andres’s group
encompasses an even broader section of society than Jose’s group, as
it refers to all of the family members of individuals who refused to
join Mara 18.189 The BIA determined that if Jose’s alleged group
was too broad to meet the particularity and social visibility
requirements for asylum, then Andres’s even broader group must also
fail, as its members would be even less particularized and less
socially visible.190
The Fifth Circuit determined that the BIA’s interpretation of the
particularity and social visibility requirements for asylum were not
arbitrary or capricious, but reasonable given the given the ambiguity
of the term “particular social group” in the INA.191 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the BIA’s decision that the Orellana-Monson
brothers failed to meet the requirements for membership in a
particular social group.192 As the brothers failed to qualify as
members of a particular social group, they could not have a “well
founded fear or persecution as a result of membership in such [a]
group.”193 Therefore, the Orellana-Monson brothers were not
eligible for asylum. 194 As the requirements for withholding removal
are even more stringent than asylum, the Fifth Circuit determined
that the brothers were not eligible for withholding removal either.195
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Impact:
This decision established that the Fifth Circuit, and likely other
circuits as well, will give deference to agency interpretations of
statutes, as long as the interpretations are reasonable under the
Chevron standard. The case also provided the BIA with the authority
to interpret any ambiguous terminology in the INA on a case-by-case
basis. This case-by-case application has the potential to allow for
inconsistent or even contradictory BIA decisions depending on the
manner in which the BIA chooses to interpret the terminology in
each case. Thus, the circuit courts, and possibly the Supreme Court,
will likely be confronted with additional cases challenging the BIA’s
interpretations of the INA’s terms.

